



By Thomas M. Hoenig
W
ithin our financial system, a bank’s prospects and viability
depend on its ability to attract investors and customers. This
fundamental need means that banks and bank management
must operate under the framework of market discipline and in a manner
that meets the dictates of market participants. In other words, market
discipline serves as the principal force influencing the performance of our
financial markets.
The financial revolution we are now experiencing is clearly increasing
the importance of market discipline in banking. Most notably, the
removal of many traditional bank regulatory restraints and controls over
the past few decades is expanding the role of the marketplace in allocat-
ing financial resources, encouraging innovation, and exerting discipline
over banks.
However, as the importance of market discipline is increasing, an
essential prerequisite for effective market discipline—timely and accurate
information to guide market participants—is becoming more difficult to
achieve, even with the many advances we are making in processing and
analyzing financial data. In particular, the ongoing financial revolution is
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contributing to a rapidly growing complexity in financial instruments
and services, as demonstrated by the substantial increase in bank trading
activities, derivatives, securitization, and global markets. The increasing
size and scope of major institutions are also contributing to this com-
plexity, along with the continuous changes in these institutions’ balance
sheet and off-balance sheet positions.
Consequently, a critical goal for us to explore is how to enhance
market discipline by providing market participants with adequate,
timely, and accurate information for making decisions. A recent and
very important example of this goal is the third pillar of the revised
Basel Capital Accord framework. This pillar seeks to reinforce market
discipline by requiring banks to make more effective disclosure of their
risk profiles and capital adequacy. 
In my comments, I will focus on the issue of what bank supervisors
might be able to do to improve market access to information on banking
organizations and to thereby enhance financial market discipline. I will
first explore the role of market discipline in banking and look at recent
steps taken to improve bank disclosures and transparency. Then I will
examine what value might be added by increased supervisory disclosure
and what options bank supervisors have to improve the flow of informa-
tion to bank investors and customers.
I.  THE ROLE OF MARKET DISCIPLINE
Market discipline and the related need for information disclosure
have a variety of meanings and implications for each of us. In banking,
market discipline can be described most directly through the various ways
the market and its participants voice their views on the performance of a
bank’s directors and management. An extremely important aspect in this
market discipline is the value stockholders place on a bank’s equity. These
valuations, in fact, provide a forward-looking guide to how well investors
expect a bank and its management to perform. Equity values further
reflect the market’s view of the safety of a bank’s portfolio, its liquidity,
and the expected returns adjusted for risk. If the market judges manage-
ment as failing to pursue appropriate risk-return tradeoffs, investors will
drive a bank’s value below that of other investment choices.ECONOMIC REVIEW • THIRD QUARTER 2003 7
Bank debtholders and large depositors also constitute part of the
market discipline over a bank. Both debtholders and depositors seek to
place their funds in safe, solvent institutions. Furthermore, they expect
to be compensated for any added risks they elect to assume.
For bank managers, equity values and the interest rates on deposits
and debt thus provide signals that cannot be easily ignored, since a
manager’s job and compensation will depend on the bank’s performance
in these areas. Declining equity values and increases in funding costs, for
instance, provide a clear indication that a bank’s management is failing to
meet the competitive standards of the marketplace and will need to
improve or be replaced. This need to satisfy market participants thus
constitutes market discipline. Ultimately, market discipline is the force to
which all managers must answer. Moreover, market discipline has
nothing to do with how well supervisors can read the market or what
actions supervisors might take themselves—instead this market force
represents the combined views of all market participants.
Supervisors, though, can play an important role in market disci-
pline by assuring that valid information is brought forward—not only
to bank management but also to the market itself. The goal of disclos-
ing such information would be to influence the actions of bank
management while allowing the market to value bank assets, income
streams, and the risk-return equation more accurately. As a result, exam-
ination and other supervisory information, if delivered correctly and
well, could serve to enhance market discipline.
II.  RECENT STEPS TO IMPROVE BANK DISCLOSURES
Current bank disclosures largely consist of regulatory reporting
requirements; SEC disclosure requirements for banking organizations
with publicly traded securities; voluntary disclosures banks make to
investors, financial analysts, and rating agencies; and disclosures
under international accounting standards for banks with foreign oper-
ations. In all of these areas, the demands of investors and customers
for more information—along with technological improvements in
information processing—are leading to a number of notable changes
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stand these changes and their implications for market discipline and
bank transparency before going on to look at the options for increas-
ing supervisory disclosure.
The amount of information that banks are asked to report in their
regulatory Reports of Condition and Income has continued to expand
over the past few decades, and this trend likely will continue. Banks
now report far more detailed information by individual loan categories
and in a number of other areas, such as off-balance sheet activities and
risk exposures. Also, from a supervisory perspective, formal regulatory
enforcement actions and CRA ratings have been disclosed since 1990.
In addition, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and market reactions to
Enron and other recent accounting scandals are bringing strong pressure
for greater and more accurate reporting by publicly traded organizations.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, for instance, requires the CEOs and CFOs of all
public companies to certify the accuracy of the reports they file with the
SEC and comment on the effectiveness of their internal controls. This act
also directs public companies to disclose material changes on a rapid and
current basis, shortens the time for reporting insider transactions,
strengthens the SEC disclosure review process, tightens audit committee
requirements, and provides for greater oversight of accounting firms and
limits the nonaudit services these firms may offer.
While the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation is directed at publicly traded
corporations, portions of this act will apply to a much larger group of
banks. For instance, FDICIA filing requirements will extend the act’s
auditor independence provisions to banks with over $500 million in
assets, and the banking agencies have proposed extending various cor-
porate governance provisions of the act to nonpublicly traded banks,
as appropriate. 
As I mentioned earlier, the third pillar of the Basel II Capital
Accord will further increase public disclosures by the largest U.S. banks.
Although the final disclosure standards haven’t been specified, the
recently released Third Consultative Paper (2003) indicates that large
U.S. banks adopting the Basel II framework will be subject to extensive
disclosures related to their capital structure, credit risk mitigation, asset
securitization and their assessment of credit risk, market risk, interest
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Bank supervisors will necessarily have an important role to play in
each of these steps. All of these steps, moreover, will help to bring a
broader range of information to investors and bank customers over the
next few years and increase the level of scrutiny over bank reporting.
However, as banks continue the shift toward more complex and actively
traded financial instruments, transparency in banking, undoubtedly,
will continue to be a challenge.
III. WHAT UNIQUE INFORMATION COULD
SUPERVISORS BRING FORWARD?
Because of the banking industry’s systemic role in our economy and
given the complexity of its activities and difficulty with the reporting of
these activities, bank supervisors are mandated to engage in a process of
formal bank examinations. These examinations provide supervisors
detailed access to bank activities and place them in a unique position to
collect and analyze banking data.
In their assessment of banks, for instance, examiners make use of
proprietary and internal information at each bank, as well as confiden-
tial information on customers—all of which is generally unavailable to
market participants trying to track an institution’s condition and per-
formance. The analysis of such information and the steps banks take to
control and manage risk, when aggregated, form much of the basis
needed to understand the risk exposures at banks.
Supervisory agencies also devote extensive resources to examining
banks and have developed the CAMELS and BOPEC rating systems
and related procedures for analyzing banking organizations. These super-
visory resources, along with the access to internal information, allow
bank examiners to come to factual findings and conclusions that would
be of strong interest to bank investors and customers. Much of this in-
depth analysis is not readily available from other independent sources.
As a result, examiners have a detailed knowledge of individual bank
conditions that could prove useful in several ways. Disclosure of finan-
cial positions, risk concentrations, and asset profiles, for instance, could
provide a new and valuable source of information to the market. In
addition, examiners would be in a good position to identify deficiencies
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IV. POSSIBLE OPTIONS FOR INCREASING
SUPERVISORY DISCLOSURE
As we move toward the third pillar of the revised Capital Accord
and greater reliance on market discipline, some have suggested, and I
believe reasonably so, that supervisory information could help the
markets be better informed and, thus, enhance market discipline.
There are a number of different ways supervisors could help to
increase the level of disclosure in banking and thereby enhance
market forces. Let me mention three of the basic approaches that
could be followed.
Supervisory review and evaluation of a bank’s own disclosures
One possible initiative would be to have examiners review the ade-
quacy and accuracy of a banking organization’s own disclosures.
Examiners are already being drawn, in part, to this role as they carefully
review internal and external sources of information on a bank or
banking organization during an examination and assess the inherent
risk exposures. As an example, PNC Financial Services Group restated
its 2001 earnings after Federal Reserve examiners objected to the
manner in which PNC was accounting for loans that it sold to several
subsidiaries. Most of us believe that examiners should continue to
extend this role, as recommended in the 2000 Federal Reserve Staff
Study on “Improving Public Disclosure in Banking.”
However, there are some questions regarding how far examiners
should go in reviewing bank disclosures and how they can effectively
supplement, rather than duplicate, similar efforts by internal and exter-
nal auditors, the SEC, and the new Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board. In particular, we will have to be careful that we don’t
turn bank exams into audits. Such a step could shortchange the tradi-
tional role of examiners in assessing bank risk exposures and make less
than optimal use of examination resources.ECONOMIC REVIEW • THIRD QUARTER 2003 11
Disclosure of significant or material examination findings
As a second option, supervisors could require banks to disclose sig-
nificant or material examination findings. Although the SEC already
requires publicly traded banks to disclose any significant news in a
timely manner, different banks have followed different practices with
regard to disclosing what supervisory items might be considered mate-
rial or useful to the market. These differences in interpretation and
disclosure practices may leave some important issues unknown to
outside parties. Disclosure of significant examination findings could,
therefore, help make a bank’s own disclosures more accurate and more
reflective of supervisory concerns. At the same time, the prospect of
having to make such disclosures would provide banks with an added
incentive to monitor and manage their risk exposures carefully and to
comply with regulatory objectives. In other words, such disclosures
would certainly facilitate the market’s role.
To implement this proposal, examiners would have to discuss with
bank management those examination findings considered to be signifi-
cant. Such findings could include credit quality problems, serious
weaknesses in internal controls and risk management systems, substan-
tial market risks, or loan portfolio or activity concentrations. They
could also encompass shortcomings in board or management structure
or a failure to maintain adequate capital relative to bank risk exposures.
Significant regulatory violations, as cited by the examiners, should
further be disclosed to the public. The bank or bank holding company,
not the examining organization, would be responsible for making the
appropriate disclosures or showing that these findings were already
reflected in the bank’s reporting.
In their conversations, examiners and bankers could also work
toward reaching an agreement on what descriptive terms would be used
to disclose significant examination issues and findings. This step would
help ensure that the examining agency adequately documents its find-
ings, the bank clearly understands its responsibility for making the
disclosures, and market participants are less likely to misinterpret the
severity of any problems. These discussions could further work out ways
of disclosing weaknesses or problems in sufficient detail, while fully pre-
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bankers should be given an opportunity to report supplemental infor-
mation to the public, along with what steps they plan to take to address
supervisory issues.
Overall, the disclosure of important examination findings and the
underlying discussions between bankers and examiners could help
provide for a constructive, and at times intense, dialogue among
bankers, the market, and supervisory authorities. I would also note that
this disclosure option could help to reduce the severity of many of the
problems identified by examiners, since bankers would be encouraged
to disclose and begin addressing these problems at an early stage. The
disclosure of examination findings further represents a natural out-
growth of the examination process, and it would help provide greater
consistency to the information publicly traded banks should already be
disclosing under SEC regulations.
A final implementation question concerns which banks should be
required to disclose key examination findings—just the large complex
banking organizations, all publicly traded banking organizations, or
every bank. Because all publicly traded banking organizations are
already required by the SEC to disclose any significant or material find-
ings, such organizations would provide a logical starting point. These
organizations report to investors on at least a quarterly basis and more
frequently when necessary. Depending on the importance of examina-
tion findings, these organizations could make the relevant disclosures in
their next quarterly report or, if more urgent, through special press
releases. For nonpublicly traded smaller banks, the disclosure of impor-
tant examination findings is more problematic. The stock of these
institutions often is closely held or not widely traded, so there is no
ready means to foster disclosure in a systematic way.
Disclosure of bank examination ratings
Another option for consideration is the disclosure of bank or
holding company examination ratings. Since examination ratings reflect
the assessments of experienced examiners, disclosure of these ratings
might provide important insights regarding the condition of banks.ECONOMIC REVIEW • THIRD QUARTER 2003 13
However, I am less comfortable with disclosing examination ratings
than with the disclosure of significant supervisory findings. In fact,
there are a number of issues associated with ratings disclosure that will
need further study and discussion. Most important, examination
ratings are designed for the internal use of the banking agencies. They
come with little explanation, little dialogue with the bank, and one typ-
ically needs considerably more information than can be provided to the
market to fully understand the analysis behind the rating. 
If examination ratings were to be publicly disclosed without signif-
icant additional data and commentary, several significant problems
could arise. A major concern, for instance, would be possible overreac-
tions by market participants whenever they fail to correctly interpret
exam ratings. Also, examinations could become less useful for supervi-
sory purposes if circumstance required examiners to simplify the ratings
system and its underlying analysis. Another potential difficulty would
be maintaining reasonably consistent ratings across banks, given exist-
ing differences in bank activities, size of operations, and primary
supervisors. One other critical concern is whether the disclosure of
examination ratings would serve to replace, reduce, or be confounded
with private market sources of information and analysis—an outcome
that could weaken rather than enhance the market’s role.
I also am concerned that the assignment of examination ratings, in
part, may be backward looking, focusing on what bank management
has previously done instead of where a bank is now headed. For
example, examiners may continue to rate a bank adversely after it
begins to take appropriate steps to address past problems—a good
reason for doing so is to ensure close supervisory oversight of the bank
until it fully recovers. To the extent this occurs, the disclosure of exami-
nation ratings could involve misunderstandings in the market and,
thus, fail to provide a positive force guiding ongoing activities.
I recognize that supervisors have taken significant steps in recent
years to make examinations more risk-focused and reflective of current
and prospective risk exposures. I also recognize that examiners could
disclose to the market some of the supplemental information behind
their ratings, but I doubt that this would be sufficient, or even possible,
in all cases and could lead the market to an incorrect view of a bank. I14 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
believe such problems could largely be avoided by focusing disclosures
on significant examination findings and related information rather than
the ratings themselves.
V. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
A variety of factors are increasing the importance of market disci-
pline and information disclosure in banking. The financial revolution
that is now taking our banking industry into many new directions is
giving the market a growing role in determining what banks do, how
they do it, and what their rewards will be. In return, we have seen the
banking industry become more innovative and responsive to the needs
of financial customers and investors. However, for all of this market
process to work and to foster a sound and capable banking industry,
market participants must have access to accurate, comprehensive, and
timely information. This need for information, moreover, is occurring
at the same time that banking and financial products are becoming
more complex and, in many ways, more opaque. 
Although bank supervisors must be very careful in defining the role
they will play in financial markets, they could inject a key source of trans-
parency into the market process. Most notably, supervisors have access to
a variety of information at banks, including both public and confidential
data. In addition, supervisors expend substantial resources in analyzing
this information and assessing the condition of individual banks.
As a result, increased disclosure of supervisory information could be
of significant value to the market and is consequently a topic that deserves
further thought and study by all of us. I believe that one supervisory
option—requiring publicly traded banks to disclose any significant weak-
nesses or material findings identified by examiners—could be readily
incorporated into examination and disclosure policies and could greatly
help to enhance the effectiveness of market discipline.